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 Policing the Wombs of the World’s Women: The Mexico 
City Policy 
SAMANTHA LALISAN* 
We refuse to sign a law that is anti-democratic, a law that undermines 
national sovereignty, limits the right of free speech and the ability of our 
providers to provide the best care to all . . . . [W]e refuse to sign a law 
that plays with women’s lives . . . .1 
INTRODUCTION  
Historically, the United States has used foreign aid to facilitate stability abroad, 
encourage change in other governments, and export democratic ideals.2 Indeed, a 
central attraction of foreign aid is the power it gives policymakers over other 
governments. The U.S. government generally has conditioned its foreign aid in order 
to further its own policy goals.3 Foreign aid has been described as “perhaps the best 
tool that exists, to get other governments, especially poor and weak ones, to act in 
the ‘right way.’”4 However, the use of foreign aid as foreign policy can raise serious 
policy concerns and run counter to core constitutional values, which is especially 
problematic when restrictions on aid undermine democratic processes abroad.5 
 
 
 * J.D. 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A. 2016, University of 
California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank the editors of the Indiana Law Journal for their 
help in getting this Comment ready for publication. I would especially like thank Professor 
Dawn Johnsen for her guidance and helpful feedback.  
 1. TAYLOR LEWIS, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY HARMS WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD: THE IMPACT ON LATIN AMERICA, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC 




 2. See generally JEFFREY F. TAFFET, FOREIGN AID AS FOREIGN POLICY: THE ALLIANCE 
FOR PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA 1–4 (2007); see also Nina J. Crimm, The Global Gag Rule: 
Undermining National Interests by Doing unto Foreign Women and NGOs What Cannot Be 
Done at Home, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 587, 588 (2007) (“[E]lected politicians intentionally 
have inculcated foreign policy and foreign assistance policy with their own religious moral 
values.”).  
 3. See generally TERESA HAYTER, AID AS IMPERIALISM 15 (1971) (stating that U.S. 
foreign aid “has never been an unconditional transfer of financial resources” and the impact 
of such aid on developing countries).  
 4. TAFFET, supra note 2, at 4. 
 5. See, e.g., Rachel E. Seevers, The Politics of Gagging: The Effects of the Global Gag 
Rule on Democratic Participation and Political Advocacy in Peru, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L 899, 
899–900 (2006) (“The restrictions of the U.S. policy prevent advocacy and civil participation 
by these recipient NGOs, and infringe on their right to free speech and their ability to speak 
out in a national democratic dialogue.”); Priscilla Smith, Kathy Hall Martinez & Tzili Mor, 
The Global Gag Rule: A Violation of the Right to Free Speech and Democratic Participation, 
AM. BAR ASS’N (July 1, 2002), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human 
_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol29_2002/summer2002/irr_hr_summer02_smith/ 
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The Mexico City Policy (“the Policy” or “Global Gag Rule”) is emblematic of 
this problem. The Policy was first announced by President Regan’s administration at 
the International Conference on Population in 19846 and since then has been 
routinely rescinded and reinstated along party lines by subsequent presidential 
administrations. Generally, the Policy requires foreign nongovernmental 
organizations (FNGOs) to certify that they will not “perform or actively promote 
abortion as a method of family planning” as a condition of receiving U.S. global 
health assistance.7 Importantly, the Policy is known as the “global gag rule” because 
of the limitations it places on FNGOs. Such organizations are prohibited from using 
their own funds to provide legal abortion services, prohibited from actively 
promoting abortion by “[l]obbying a foreign government to legalize or make 
available abortion as a method of family planning,”8 and prohibited from 
“[c]onducting a public information campaign in foreign countries regarding . . . 
abortion.”9 These conditions effectively restrict the speech of FNGOs.10  
The frequent rescission and reinstatement of the Policy has made it into a known 
“political football” in which Democratic administrations will rescind the Policy and 
Republican administrations will reinstate it.11 Typically, each Republican 
administration maintained the Policy relatively unchanged from that initially 
instituted by the Reagan administration. However, when President Donald Trump 
reinstated the Policy one day after his inauguration, he changed this practice by 
expanding the scope of the Policy and thereby created global health concerns for 
developing countries.12 This unprecedented expansion, which I will call “Trump’s 
Global Gag Rule” (“Trump GGR”), is even more egregious than previous 
Republican administrations because it extends restrictions to an estimated $8.8 
billion in U.S. global health assistance from the previous $575 million in restricted 
 
 
[https://perma.cc/5G9H-L3K2] (“The global gag rule erects barriers to the development of the 
democratic process in other countries, the promotion of civil society and development of 
FNGOs abroad, and the enhancement of women’s equality and participation in the political 
process.”). 
 6. See Susan A. Cohen, The Mexico City Policy: A ‘Gag Rule’ That Violates Free Speech 
and Democratic Values, in THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY 1 (1998).  
 7. USAID, STANDARD PROVISIONS FOR NON-U.S. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
A MANDATORY REFERENCE FOR ADS CHAPTER 303, at 86 (2019).  
 8.  Id. at 90, 94.  
 9. Id.; see also id. at 86–89 (stating that the Mexico City Policy is formally known as 
“Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance”).  
 10. Admittedly, FNGOs are not forced into accepting foreign aid from the U.S. and can 
refuse U.S. aid if the FNGOs find the conditions reprehensible. However, the current state of 
foreign aid makes refusing such aid overwhelming impracticable because the funding 
sometimes constitutes an overwhelming majority of a recipient FNGO’s funding. 
 11. See infra Section I.C.2.  
 12. Donald J. Trump, Presidential Memorandum Regarding the Mexico City Policy, THE 
WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
memorandum-regarding-mexico-city-policy/ [https://perma.cc/2BCT-3692] (“I direct the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to the 
extent allowable by law, to implement a plan to extend the requirements of the reinstated 
Memorandum to global health assistance furnished by all departments or agencies.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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funds.13 The Trump GGR expanded the Policy’s application from international 
family planning to all “global health assistance furnished by all departments or 
agencies” instead of applying only to the State Department and United States Aid for 
International Development (USAID).14  
Not only does the Policy, and now the Trump GGR, play politics with the lives of 
women around the world, but it undermines democratic values and processes that 
American foreign policy purportedly seeks to advance around the world. For 
example, in her statement before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Susana Silva Galdos15 captured the core First Amendment issues 
regarding the Policy. She said:  
I have not been allowed to speak about [abortion] under the global gag 
rule . . . I will return to my country tomorrow; I will again be silenced. 
But now, at least for today, I can speak freely here in the United States, 
not my country . . . We in Peru believe in democracy, as do you, citizens 
of the United States. But democracy is not only for one country. The 
global gag rule . . . is against democracy because it makes a distinction 
between the United States and the rest of the world.16  
The gagging of Galdos’s speech within her own country demonstrates the deeply 
hypocritical nature of the Policy. If the restrictions imposed on Galdos and FNGOs 
were imposed on similarly situated American citizens and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), they would constitute an unconstitutional violation of the 
First Amendment right to free speech.17 Although there are legitimate (and usually 
“traditional”) reasons for the distinct treatment of aliens and citizens regarding the 
right of free speech,18 the treatment demonstrates a significant divergence from 
 
 
 13. Trump’s ‘Mexico City Policy’ or ‘Global Gag Rule,’ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 
14, 2018, 12:55 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/trumps-mexico-city-policy-or-
global-gag-rule [https://perma.cc/USW4-XKDQ]; see also Margaret Talbot, Trump Makes the 
Global Gag Rule on Abortion Even Worse, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/trump-makes-the-global-gag-rule-on-
abortion-even-worse [https://perma.cc/3LKM-63KG]. 
 14. Sneha Barot, When Antiabortion Ideology Turns into Foreign Policy: How the Global 
Gag Rule Erodes Health, Ethics and Democracy, 20 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 73, 73 (2017). 
 15. Galdos is a citizen of Peru and President of a foreign nongovernmental organization 
that receives foreign aid from the United States.  
 16. Mexico City Policy: Effects of Restrictions on International Family Planning 
Funding: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 170th Cong. 28, 30 (2001) 
(statement of Susana Silva Galdos, President, Movement Manuela Ramos, Lima Peru) 
[hereinafter Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations]. 
 17. See USAID v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) (“It is, 
however, a basic First Amendment principle that ‘freedom of speech prohibits the government 
from telling people what they must say.’”); Julia L. Ernst, Laura Katzive & Erica Smock,  The 
Global Pattern of U.S. Initiatives Curtailing Women’s Reproductive Rights: A Perspective on 
the Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 783 (2004) (“[S]everal 
members of Congress sent a letter to the Bush administration requesting that the global gag 
rule be extended to apply to U.S.-based organization, a move that would clearly be 
unconstitutional . . . .”).  
 18. Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and 
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firmly held First Amendment values of maintaining a robust market place of ideas,19 
defending the right to engage in expression that may be controversial or disagreeable 
to society,20 and maintaining democratic self-governance.21 Notwithstanding formal 
limits on the applicability of the First Amendment outside U.S. borders, the very fact 
that the United States is doing unto foreigners what it cannot do to U.S. citizens is 
problematic and unjustified. Indeed, “if we truly believe in the basic constitutional 
right of free speech and association, we should want to promote them worldwide 
rather than to evade them outside our territorial boundaries.”22  
Galdos’s statements also highlight the tension between the goals of foreign aid 
and the Policy’s restrictions on speech. U.S. foreign aid is largely overseen by 
USAID, whose stated objectives are to “promote and demonstrate democratic values 
abroad, and advance a free, peaceful, and prosperous world.”23 However, in order to 
foster democracy and such values abroad it is necessary to speak, advocate, and lobby 
government actors.24 The gag rule fundamentally undermines democratic processes 
abroad and is in direct contradiction with the stated goals of USAID.  
This Comment argues that the Policy should be repealed because it undermines 
firmly held First Amendment values and would be considered unconstitutional if 
applied to domestic nongovernmental organizations (DNGOs). It proceeds in four 
parts. Part I describes the inception of the Policy and contextualizes it among other 
antiabortion policies that resulted as a backlash to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Roe v. Wade. Part II explains the Policy’s actual effect on 
FNGOs, particularly focusing on organizations based in Nepal and Peru, and argues 
that the Policy undermines democratic processes abroad and fails to achieve its stated 
objective: reducing the number of abortions. Part III examines current First 
Amendment doctrine on unconstitutional conditions and free speech and 
acknowledges standing issues regarding FNGOs. It argues that the Policy should be 
considered a violation of protected First Amendment speech because if it were 
 
 
Beyond—Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1544 (2010) (“Traditional First 
Amendment theories or justifications have generally assumed that the First Amendment is a 
wholly domestic concern, one generally impervious to events, laws, or persons outside U.S. 
borders.”).  
 19. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be        
carried out.”).  
 20. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT     
15 (1948). 
 21. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 
(2011) (“[T]he best possible explanation for the shape of the First Amendment doctrine is the 
value of democratic governance.”).  
 22. Crimm, supra note 2, at 592; see also Cohen, supra note 6, at 1 (“Promoting 
democracy is an explicit U.S. foreign policy objective reflecting core American values such 
as free speech, access to the political process and the right, in the words of the United States 
Constitution itself, ‘to petition the government for a redress of grievances.’”).  
 23. Mission, Vision and Values, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-
vision-values [https://perma.cc/62YF-ZW65].  
 24. Brief of International Law Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, 
Center for Reprod. Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183 (2001) (No. 01-6168). 
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applied to DNGOs it would be considered unconstitutional. In Part IV the Comment 
considers foundational First Amendment values (the marketplace of ideas, individual 
autonomy, and democratic self-governance) and argues that the Policy should be 
repealed, or at the very least revised, because it undermines and contradicts each of 
these values.25 
I. ROE V. WADE BACKLASH: DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL GAG RULE  
The Mexico City Policy is by no means an isolated instance of abortion restriction, 
and it should be considered in tandem with other domestic and foreign policies 
established after the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe v. Wade.26 This 
is most clearly seen in the Helms Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act and the 
Hyde Amendment. The Policy, and now Trump’s GGR, is also part of this greater 
effort to restrict women’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion and part of a 
conservative backlash against Roe. However, it has far surpassed previous legislation 
that restricted the use of U.S. funds for abortion-related purposes.  
A. The Helms Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act  
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) 
which authorized him to  
furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, 
for voluntary population planning. In addition to the provision of family 
planning information and services, including also information and 
services which relate to and support natural family planning methods         
. . . population planning programs shall emphasize motivation for small 
families.27  
The primary purported purpose of the FAA was to aid under-developed countries in 
making progress. On signing the FAA, President Kennedy stated that “[t]he long-
term commitment of development funds, which the bill authorizes, will assist the 
under-developed countries of the world to take the critical steps essential to economic 
and social progress.”28 The underlying justification for the FAA was the development 
and maintenance of democracy in the developing world with an understanding that 
providing aid to other countries ensured security and peace for the United States. For 
instance, President Johnson, in a statement to Congress regarding foreign aid, stated: 
“The incessant cycle of hunger, ignorance, and disease is the common blight of the 
 
 
 25. Some scholars have argued that the Policy violates international law. See, e.g., 
Michele Goodwin, Challenging the Rhetorical Gag and Trap: Reproductive Capacities, 
Rights, and the Helms Amendment, 12 NW. U. L. REV. 1417, 1429 (2018); Julia Hahn, The 
Detrimental Effects of President Donald Trump’s Executive Order Restricting Access to 
Healthcare in Foreign Countries, 18 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 418, 424 (2017).  
 26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 27. 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(b) (2016).  
 28. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Foreign Assistance Act, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
588 (Sept. 4, 1961).  
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developing world. This vicious pattern can be broken. It must be broken if democracy 
is to survive.”29 With regard to family planning and population growth, President 
Johnson was clear that such policies are a “question for each family and each nation 
to decide.”30 
However, this notion of allowing individual families and countries to decide 
family and population-planning policies was clearly not followed. In 1973, the year 
Roe was decided, Congress passed the Helms Amendment to the FAA which 
prohibits the use of U.S. foreign aid for abortion services.31 Specifically, the 
Amendment states: “None of the funds . . . may be used to pay for the performance 
of abortions as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to 
practice abortions.”32 When proposing this Amendment, former Senator Jesse Helms 
of North Carolina, a strident antiabortionist, said, “[u]nless Congress does so now, 
we will soon see the day when abortifacient drugs and techniques dominate AID’s 
program, and the United States becomes the world’s largest exporter of death.”33 
The Helms Amendment was met with significant pushback because domestic and 
foreign experts considered safe-abortion services a fundamental aspect of 
reproductive health care and family planning. For instance, under President Nixon, 
USAID strongly opposed the Amendment and wrote that the Agency  
explicitly acknowledges that every nation should be free to determine its 
own policies and procedures with respect to population growth and 
family planning. In contradiction of this principle, the Amendment 
would place U.S. restrictions on both developing country governments 
and individuals in the matter of free choice among the means of fertility 
control . . . that are legal in the U.S.34 
Indeed, the timing of the Helms Amendment with the recent Roe decision made the 
hypocrisy even more apparent. Effectively, through the Amendment, the United 
States would not provide women in other countries the same reproductive health care 
options—the right to obtain an abortion—that it gave American women that same 
year, except in cases to save the woman’s life, rape, or incest. 
When promoting his Amendment, Helms knew that it would not make foreign 
governments and other organizations that have been promoting abortion “suddenly 
stop when they are not allowed to use U.S. Government funds for that purpose.”35 
Accordingly, the Amendment provides flexibility in this regard by requiring that, 
specifically, U.S. funds not be used for abortion purposes, while private funds may 
be used for abortion purposes.36 Indeed, Helms even stated that Congress could “go 
 
 
 29. Special Message to the Congress on the Foreign Aid Program, 1 PUB. PAPERS 117, 
118 (Feb. 1, 1966). 
 30. Id. at 120.  
 31. See Jesseca Boyer, What Congress Can Do to Restore U.S. Leadership on Global 
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, 21 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 55, 58 (2018).  
 32. 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(1) (2016). 
 33. 119 CONG. REC. 32292, 32294 (1973).  
 34. Rosoff Jl, Senate-House Conferees Consider Helms Amendment, Planned 
Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo 1–2 (1973).  
 35. 119 CONG. REC. 32292, 32294 (1973).  
 36. Yvette Aguilar, Gagging on a Bad Rule: The Mexico City Policy and its Effect on 
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far beyond the present amendment and require all abortion activities, from whatever 
funds, to be stopped before our assistance could be received. But the present 
amendment does not do that . . . it is certainly permissible to require each recipient 
to agree not to use our money for killing the unborn.”37 
Despite this flexibility, the Amendment was a fundamental shift from soft law 
practices of using aid to advance rule of law initiatives, promote democracy, and 
create stability abroad.38 Instead, the Amendment deliberately plays with the needs 
of countries desperate to relieve poverty and coerces them into accepting reforms 
demanded by “the host country.”39 That is, Helms knew that by attaching policies he 
deemed morally acceptable—abolishing abortion—to aid that receiving countries 
needed, he could advance a specific policy that he could actually not advance 
domestically. Although the Amendment has restricted the use of U.S. aid for abortive 
practices for decades, the Policy, and now the Trump GGR, have gone far beyond 
the Amendment and are inconsistent with the Helms Amendment to the FAA.  
B. The Hyde Amendment  
The successful passage of the Helms Amendment in 1973 provided groundwork 
for a very similar domestic bill in 1977—the Hyde Amendment. When introducing 
his bill, Representative Henry Hyde stated during a floor debate: “I certainly would 
like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich woman, a 
middle-class woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle is the . . . 
Medicaid bill. A life is a life.”40 Like the Helms Amendment, the Hyde Amendment 
was a response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe and sought to restrict a woman’s 
right to an abortion by placing a burden on those who relied on health care through 
Medicaid.41 Specifically, the Amendment states that “[n]one of the funds contained 
in this Act shall be used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother 
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term.”42 The Amendment has also 
been used as a model for analogous restrictions for those who are insured, not through 
Medicaid, but other government programs.43 However, seventeen states do have 
policies that allow the use of state funds to provide abortions for low-income women 
using Medicaid.44  
 
 
Women in Developing Countries, 5 SCHOLAR 37, 43 (2002). 
 37. 119 CONG. REC. 32292, 32293 (1973). 
 38. TAFFET, supra note 2, at 3.  
 39. 119 CONG. REC. 32292, 32293.  
 40. 123 CONG. REC. 19693, 19700 (1977).  
 41. Nicole Huberfeld, Conditional Spending and Compulsory Maternity, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 751, 754 (2010).  
 42. Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1434, (Sept. 30, 1976).  
 43. Megan K. Donovan, In Real Life: Federal Restrictions on Abortion Coverage and the 
Women They Impact, 20 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (2017). 
 44. Heather D. Boonstra, Abortion in the Lives of Women Struggling Financially: Why 
Insurance Coverage Matters, 19 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 46, 48 (2016). The Hyde 
Amendment, notoriously, impacts women of color and low-income women. See Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 332 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Worse yet, the Hyde Amendment 
does not foist that majoritarian viewpoint with equal measure upon everyone in our Nation, 
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The Hyde Amendment was upheld in Harris v. McRae when the closely divided 
Supreme Court found that even though Roe establishes a woman’s right to obtain an 
abortion, “it does not follow that a woman’s freedom to choose carries with it a 
constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range 
of protected choices . . . . [T]he Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at 
least the same range of choice[s]” when deciding to obtain an abortion.45 The Court 
relied on Maher v. Roe when it held that while the state and federal government 
cannot place obstacles in a woman’s decision regarding abortion, the government 
“need not remove obstacles not of its own creation.”46 This means that if a woman 
cannot afford an abortion, she has no positive right to assert a right to a paid abortion 
by the government, and her own refusal to pay for an abortion is an individual 
problem.47  
In dissent, Justice Brennan recognized the legislature’s attempt to circumvent the 
Court’s decision in Roe by undermining a woman’s right to an abortion through 
funding requirements. Justice Brennan correctly notes that the Hyde Amendment’s 
“denial of public funds for medically necessary abortions plainly intrudes upon” the 
decision in Roe because it “coerce[s] indigent pregnant women to bear children that 
they would otherwise elect not to have.”48 Indeed, the “Hyde Amendment is nothing 
less than an attempt by Congress to circumvent the dictates of the Constitution and 
achieve indirectly what Roe v. Wade said it could not do directly.”49 
The Helms Amendment of 1973 and the Hyde Amendment (“the Amendments”) 
are, undoubtedly, part of a larger antiabortion movement that was fueled by the 
Court’s decision in Roe. Both Amendments have circumvented the essential holding 
of Roe by attaching restrictions on funding. For instance, the Amendments require 
that federal government funds not be used to provide abortion. In the case of the 
Helms Amendment, U.S. foreign aid cannot be used to provide women in foreign 
countries with abortions50 and, under the Hyde Amendment, federal government 
funds through healthcare programs such as Medicaid cannot be used to fund 
abortions.51 Ironically, proponents of other policies that restrict government funding 
for abortion services, such as the Policy, argue that such additional policies are 
necessary to keep government funding from supporting abortion even though they 
know that U.S. funds have not supported abortion, domestically or abroad, since the 
 
 
rich and poor alike, rather, it imposes that viewpoint only upon that segment of our society 
which, because of its position of political powerlessness, is least able to defend its privacy 
rights from the encroachments of state mandated morality.”). See generally Rebecca A. Hart, 
No Exceptions Made: Sexual Assault Against Native American Women and the Denial of 
Reproductive Healthcare Services, 25 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 209 (2010); Brooke McGee, 
Assault Victims: An Analysis of South Dakota’s Denial of Medicaid-Funded Abortion for Rape 
and Incest Victims and Why the Hyde Amendment Must Be Repealed, 27 GEO. MASON U. CIV. 
RTS. L.J. 77 (2016).  
 45. 448 U.S. 297, 298 (1980).  
 46. Id. at 316; see also Huberfeld, supra note 41, at 754. 
 47. Huberfeld, supra note 41, at 754. 
 48. McRae, 448 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 49. Id. at 331.  
 50. Boyer, supra note 31, at 58. 
 51. Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1434 (Sept. 30, 1976). 
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passage of the Helms and Hyde Amendments.52 This push for the Policy, despite the 
existence of these Amendments, signals that the Policy may actually be meant to do 
more than simply keep abortions unfunded by the government.53 Indeed, on almost 
all fronts, the Policy and Trump’s GGR far surpass the objectives of the Helms and 
Hyde Amendments. 
C. The Mexico City Policy  
The U.S. delegation, led by former Senator James L. Buckley,54 who was 
appointed chairman by President Regan, first announced the Policy at the 1984 
United Nations International Conference on Population in Mexico City:  
[T]he United States does not consider abortion an acceptable element of 
family planning programs and will no longer contribute to those of which 
it is a part. Accordingly, when dealing with nations which support 
abortion with funds not provided by the United States Government, the 
United States will contribute to such nations through segregated accounts 
which cannot be used for abortion. Moreover, the United States will no 
longer contribute to separate nongovernmental organizations which 
perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in 
other nations.55 
The following explores the challenges to the Policy, the frequent rescission and 
reinstatement of the Policy along party lines, and President Trump’s expansion of 
the Policy.  
1. Early Challenges  
After the Reagan Administration announced the Policy, there was an immediate 
backlash and lawsuits were filed challenging it. The first challenge was in Alan 
Guttmacher Institute v. Agency for International Aid.56 The complaint was filed in 
 
 
 52. See Barot, supra note 14.  
 53. See, e.g., Seevers, supra note 5, at 907–08 (“The Gag Rule went even further than the 
Helms Amendment and prohibited family planning centers and health care advocates from 
using their own, non-U.S. money to discuss the impact of abortions, educate women on the 
availability of abortions, or advocate to their own governments for changes in restrictive 
abortion laws.”).  
 54. Senator Buckley was an ardent opponent of the Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade. The 
former Senator sponsored several unsuccessful constitutional amendments to ban abortion 
outright. Indeed, he suggested several times that his antiabortion stance and actions were 
necessary because of “the ethical tradition of more than 2,000 years of Western civilization  
. . . .” JAMES L. BUCKLEY, IF MEN WERE ANGELS: A VIEW FROM THE SENATE 52 (1975).  
 55. The White House Office of Policy and Development, US Policy Statement for the 
International Conference on Population, 10 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 574, 578 (1984); see 
also, The Mexico City Policy: An Explainer, KFF: GLOBAL HEALTH POL’Y (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/fact-sheet/mexico-city-policy-explainer/#footnote-
257134-1 [hereinafter KFF Explainer].  
 56. 616 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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response to USAID’s denial of funding for one of the Guttmacher Institute’s 
publications, International Family Planning Perspectives, because it tended to 
promote abortion.57 Although the initial complaint did not include a cause of action 
against the Policy, the plaintiff, a DNGO, later sought to amend its complaint to 
challenge it.58 The court ultimately denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the 
complaint because there were “no issues which are yet ripe for judicial decision.”59 
The Policy was again challenged on constitutional grounds in DKT Memorial 
Fund Ltd. v. Agency for International Development, filed by FNGOs and DNGOs 
against the U.S. government to fund groups that engaged in abortion-related 
practices.60 The plaintiffs argued a statutory and a constitutional claim. First, they 
argued that the Policy runs afoul of the FAA and contravenes congressional limits 
and intent.61 The plaintiffs argued that the Policy violates the FAA because it goes 
further than the statutory limits.62 They specifically referred to Senator Helms’s 
statement before Congress that they “could . . . go far beyond the present amendment 
and require all abortion activities, from whatever funds, to be stopped before our 
assistance could be received.”63 The plaintiffs then argued that it follows that 
Congress thought about expanding the FAA but rejected it.64 However, the court 
found that “[t]his [was] simply not the case”65 and that a senator’s statement does not 
mean that “Congress ‘has spoken’ on the issue of whether limitations may be 
imposed on the use of non-federal funds.”66  
Second, the plaintiffs argued that the Policy “violates [their] protected First 
Amendment rights by rendering plaintiffs ineligible to receive population assistance 
funds because they engage in certain activities relating to voluntary abortion.”67 The 
court dismissed the claims of the FNGOs on standing grounds68 and held that foreign 
aliens acting outside the United States are not within the “zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute of constitutional guarantee in question.”69  
 
 
 57. Id. at 202.  
 58. Id. at 210.  
 59. Id.; see also Aguilar, supra note 36, at 68.  
 60. 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
 61. Id. at 279.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 280. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. (quoting Planned Parent Fed’n of America v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 838 F.2d 649, 
655 (2d Cir. 1988)).  
 67. Id. at 282; see also Roberta J. Sharp, Holding Abortion Speech Hostage: Conditions 
on Federal Funding of Private Population Planning Activities, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1218, 
1225 (1990). 
 68. Concurring and dissenting in part, then Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued 
that it is unnecessary to determine the standing of foreign plaintiffs “[b]ecause AID respect 
for the first amendment rights of domestic grantees should assure the relief all plaintiffs seek.” 
DKT, 887 F.2d at 299 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting in part); see also Sharp, supra 
note 67, at 1228. 
 69. DKT, 887 F.2d at 283 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United      
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982)); see also Anna Su,         
Speech Beyond Borders: Extraterritoriality and the First Amendment, 67 VAND. L. REV.   
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The Policy was again challenged in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 
Inc. v. Agency for International Development.70 The plaintiffs argued that the Policy 
violated their constitutional rights to free speech, association, and privacy. 
Specifically, they argued that the Policy  
imposes unconstitutional conditions on an important government benefit 
by requiring it to enforce restrictions on speech in order to participate as 
a conduit for AID funds to foreign NGOs[,] [and] interferes with free 
speech . . . by providing an financial incentive for [FNGOs] to abstain 
from participating with them in abortion-related activities.71 
The Second Circuit dismissed the claim and affirmed the district court’s decision that 
the Policy was implemented in “the least restrictive means” and “advance[d] a 
substantial governmental foreign policy interest.”72 
The last of the early challenges to the Policy was a 1990 case, Pathfinder Fund v. 
Agency for International Development.73 The plaintiffs, three DNGOs, argued that 
the Policy “abridge[d] their First Amendment rights of free speech and association 
by effectively preventing them from joining overseas family planning groups in 
abortion related projects.”74 The court entered summary judgement for the defendant 
and dismissed Pathfinder’s claim because it found that their right to free speech and 
association was not “substantially burdened” and the Policy was “rationally related 
to a legitimate government interest.”75 
These challenges to the Policy demonstrate the DNGOs’ and FNGOs’ immediate 
awareness of the impact the Policy had on their ability to work abroad on abortion-
related activities. Despite early findings that FNGOs lack standing to claim 
protection under the First Amendment, they still sought recourse with U.S. courts. 
Indeed, organizations have since continued to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Policy and advocate for its repeal because of its increasingly detrimental effects on 
the lives of women in developing countries and, generally, global health initiatives.76 
The consistent rescission and reinstatement of the Policy allows for a better 
understanding of how the Policy has changed with each administration and how 
organizations and communities are actually impacted. 
 
 
1373, 1388 (2014).  
 70. 915 F.2d 59, 59 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 71. Id. at 62.  
 72. Id. at 63.  
 73. 746 F. Supp. 192, 193 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 199; see also Aguilar, supra note 36, at 72.  
 76. See, e.g., Jennifer Kates & Kellie Moss, What is the Scope of the Mexico City Policy: 
Assessing Abortion Laws in Countries that Receive U.S. Global Health Assistance, KFF: 
GLOBAL HEALTH POL’Y (May 3, 2017), https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/issue-
brief/what-is-the-scope-of-the-mexico-city-policy-assessing-abortion-laws-in-countries-that-
receive-u-s-global-health-assistance/ [https://perma.cc/PUA5-4834]; Jonathan Watts, ‘Global 
Gag Rule’ Could Have Dire Impact in Latin America, Activists Warn, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 
26, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jan/26/global-
gag-rule-latin-america-abortion-contraception [https://perma.cc/4645-ZXVH]; Talbot, supra 
note 13. 
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2. The Political Football  
The Policy remained in effect until Bill Clinton became President in 1993. Two 
days after being sworn into office, President Clinton revoked the Policy and in his 
Memorandum on the Mexico City Policy said, “These excessively broad anti-
abortion conditions are unwarranted . . . [and] not mandated by the Foreign 
Assistance Act or any other law.”77 In fact, after lifting the Policy, U.S. officials 
highlighted the administration’s support for “family planning and reproductive 
health services, improving the status of women, and providing access to safe 
abortion” at the 1994 Cairo Conference.78  
However, by 1995, it was clear that the Republican-majority Congress (as a result 
of the November congressional elections) would try to restore the Policy through 
legislation.79 In 1998, Congress sent President Clinton legislation that authorized 
payment of back dues to the United Nations and reinstated the Policy.80 Threatened 
by the potential loss of a General Assembly vote by the United Nations, President 
Clinton accepted the reinstatement of the Policy for one year in order to pay the 
nearly $1 billion that the United States owed to the United Nations.81 The legislation 
required that FNGOs and other multilateral organizations sign a certification that 
they have not, and will not, perform abortions or lobby foreign governments to alter82 
abortion laws with any funds regardless of the source.83 In an effort to limit the 
impact of the certification, Clinton instructed USAID to interpret the law “in such a 
way as to minimize to the extent possible the impact on international family planning 
efforts and to respect the rights of citizens to speak freely on issues of importance in 
their countries, such as the rights of women to make their own reproductive 
decisions.”84 Additionally, the President was authorized to waive this certification 
requirement for up to $15 million to groups, but with a $12.5 million penalty out of 
the overall population aid appropriated to child health programs.85 President Clinton 
used this waiver for nine organizations that refused to sign the certification.86  
 
 
 77. Memorandum on the Mexico City Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 10 (Jan. 22, 1993).  
 78. LARRY NOWELS, POPULATION ASSISTANCE AND FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS: ISSUE 
FOR CONGRESS, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, at CRS-2 (2003).  
 79. See Susan A. Cohen, Abortion Politics and U.S. Population Aid: Coping with a 
Complex New Law, 26 INT’L FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 137, 137 (2000).  
 80. Id.; see also Seevers, supra note 5, at 908; Crimm, supra note 2, at 604.  
 81. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 599D, 113 Stat. 
1501 (1999); see also NOWELS, supra note 78, at CRS-5. 
 82. USAID defined efforts to “alter” abortion laws in the following manner: “directly 
communicating with political leaders or government officials either in support of or opposition 
to laws or policies relating to abortion; conducting public outreach efforts intended to alter 
abortions laws or policies (as opposed to those that may merely have that effect); and 
organizing demonstrations or media events with the same intent.” Cohen, supra note 79,           
at 138.  
 83. NOWELS, supra note 78, at CRS-5; Crimm, supra note 2, at 604. 
 84. Cohen, supra note 79, at 138. 
 85. NOWELS, supra note 78, at CRS-5.  
 86. Among those that refused to sign the certifications were the World Health 
Organization, the International Planned Parenthood Federation, and seven others. All nine 
organizations received $8.4 million in grants for the 2000 fiscal year. Id.  
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The political back and forth continued in 2001. As one of his first official acts in 
office, President George W. Bush restored the full terms of the Mexico City Policy 
that President Reagan instituted in 1984.87 Bush said that it was his “conviction that 
taxpayer funds should not be used to pay for abortions or advocate or actively 
promote abortion, either here or abroad.”88 Furthermore, in 2003, President Bush, in 
an attempt to garner more support from the religious right for his upcoming 
reelection, expanded the Policy to include any organization that receives U.S. funds 
under the FAA through USAID or other programs run by the State Department.89 
However, noting that the Policy and FAA are “excessively broad conditions on 
grants and assistance awards are unwarranted” and “have undermined efforts to 
promote safe and effective voluntary family planning programs in foreign nations,” 
President Barack Obama revoked Bush’s reinstatement of the Policy and expansion 
of the Policy in 2009.90  
The United States continues lurching back and forth on this Policy, and generally 
on sexual and reproductive rights. The lines between Democratic and Republican 
presidents regarding the Policy are, indeed, clear. However, the political football that 
has become of the Policy depending on the prevailing politics is deeply problematic. 
The Policy, when implemented, has led to consistent closing of programs throughout 
the developing world, has gagged several from lobbying their government, and has 
not resulted in a decrease in abortion.91 President Trump continued the work of 
 
 
 87. Memorandum for the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development (Jan. 22, 2001) [hereinafter USAID Memorandum]. The reinstatement was 
immediately challenged in July 2001 in Center for Reproductive Law & Policy v. Bush. The 
Center, a DNGO, works in collaboration with FNGOs and advocates for global abortion 
reform. The Center argued that the Policy violated international law and U.S. constitutional 
law. The lower court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The appellate court, on the merits, 
held that there was no First Amendment violation. Several of the Center’s other constitutional 
claims were dismissed on standing issues. See 304 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2002).  
 88. USAID Memorandum, supra note 87.  
 89. United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-25, § 301(b), 117 Stat. 711 (2003). The original Policy only applied to funding 
through USAID. Importantly, several members of Congress requested that President Bush 
expand the Policy to also include U.S.-based organization, “a move that would clearly be 
unconstitutional, and also apply to U.S. assistance for international HIV/AIDS programs.” 
Ernst et al., supra note 17, at 783.  
 90. Memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development, 74 Fed. Reg. 4903 (Jan. 28, 2009); see also Press 
Release, USAID Press Office, President Obama Rescinds Mexico City Policy (Jan. 26, 2009), 
https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/president-obama-rescinds-mexico-
city-policy [https://perma.cc/KH2J-E6HK]; Jake Tapper, Sunlen Miller & Huma Khan, 
Obama Overturns Mexico City Policy Implemented by Reagan, ABC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2009, 
12:59 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/International/obama-overturns-mexico-city-
policy-implemented-reagan/story?id=6716958 [https://perma.cc/R9H4-SJX7] (reporting 
Obama’s statement: “We are reminded that this decision not only protects women’s health and 
reproductive freedom but stands for a broader principle: that government should not intrude 
on our more private family matters. I remain committed to protecting a woman’s right to 
choose.”).  
 91. See, e.g., ERAN BENDAVID, PATRICK AVILA & GRANT MILLER, THE MEXICO CITY 
POLICY AND ABORTION IN AFRICA: UNITED STATES AID POLICY AND INDUCED ABORTION IN 
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previous Republican administrations by reinstating the Policy, but with his own twist 
that greatly increased its harms. 
3. Trump’s Global Gag Rule  
Three days after his inauguration and two days after the 2017 Women’s March,92 
President Donald Trump reinstated and greatly expanded the reach of the Policy93 
that plays politics with women’s lives.94 Trump’s GGR, officially named “Protecting 
Life in Global Health Assistance,”95 “represents a wider attack on global health aid 
writ large.”96 The Trump GGR extends the traditional Policy beyond the historically 
consistent $600 million in family planning to $8.8 billion in global health funding.97 
Indeed, the Policy formerly applied to USAID, but now applies to “global health 
assistance furnished by all departments or agencies.” 98 This essentially now includes 
the State Department, Department of Defense, and Department of Health and Human 
Services. The expansion from beyond family planning to global health assistance, 
and not only family planning, means that the Trump GGR applies to FNGOs working 
on health programs in the following areas: maternal and child health, nutrition, 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria under the President’s Malaria Initiative, the Zika 
virus, neglected tropical diseases, and global health security.99  
Trump’s GGR requires that recipient FNGOs and sub-recipients agree that they 
will not “perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in 
foreign countries or provide financial support to any other [FNGO] that conducts 
 
 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2011), 
https://www.who.int/bulletin/11-091660.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8G2-DUFA].  
 92. Anemona Hartocollis & Yamiche Alcindor, Women’s March Highlights as Huge 
Crowds Protest Trump: ‘We’re Not Going Away,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/us/womens-march.html [https://perma.cc/2EM4-
MYCX].  
 93. Presidential Memorandum Regarding the Mexico City Policy (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-regarding-
mexico-city-policy/; see also Barbara Stark, Mr. Trump’s Contribution to Women’s Human 
Rights, 24 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317, 339 (2018) (“Trump has taken the Gag Rule to a 
new level.”).  
 94. Lewis, supra note 1, at 2 (reporting a statement from the Regional Director of 
International Planned Parenthood/Western Hemispheric Region: “[W]e refuse to sign a law 
that plays with women’s lives and flies in the face of public health research that shows that 
banning the procedure leads to more death and injury for women, particularly the poorest 
women.”). 
 95. DEP’T OF STATE, PROTECTING LIFE IN GLOBAL HEALTH ASSISTANCE: SIX-MONTH 
REVIEW (2018) [hereinafter PLGHA SIX-MONTH REVIEW], https://www.state.gov/f/releases 
/other/278012.htm [https://perma.cc/XH5W-ZF6W].  
 96. Ann M. Starrs, The Trump Global Gag Rule: An Attack on US Family Planning and 
Global Health Aid, 389 THE LANCET 485, 485 (2017). 
 97. Andrea Montes, Reinstatement of the Global Gag Rule in 2017: Playing Politics with 
Women’s Lives around the World, 42 NOVA L. REV. 285, 288 (2018).  
 98. PLGHA SIX-MONTH REVIEW, supra note 94; see also Stark, supra note 92, at 340; 
Starrs, supra note 96, at 485. 
 99. Starrs, supra note 96, at 485; KFF Explainer, supra note 55.  
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such activities.”100 The State Department explained that “actively promot[ing] 
abortion” means “to commit resources, financial or other, in a substantial or 
continuing effort to increase the availability or use of abortion as a method of family 
planning.”101 For example, counseling and informing women of abortion as a method 
of family planning, advising women that abortion is an available option, lobbying 
foreign governments to reform abortion laws to permit abortion as a method of family 
planning, and conducting abortion information campaigns in foreign countries are 
forms of “actively promoting abortion.”102 With regard to “financial support,” some 
organizations have interpreted it to mean that FNGOs subject to the Policy cannot 
fund other organizations that perform activities that the FNGO is itself prohibited 
from undertaking.103  
Trump’s GGR does afford FNGOs some exceptions to the standard provisions. 
First, FNGOs are not considered to be actively promoting abortion if they passively 
answer any questions regarding “where a safe, legal abortion may be obtained . . . if 
the woman who is already pregnant specifically asks the questions.”104 Second, 
FNGOs are allowed to refer women for abortions where the pregnancy was the 
“result of rape or incest, or if the life of the mother would be endangered if she were 
to carry the fetus to term,”105 the woman states that she has decided to have an 
abortion, the woman asks where she can obtain a legal and safe abortion, and “the 
healthcare provider reasonably believes that the ethics of the medical profession in 
the host country requires a response regarding where it may be obtained safely and 
legally.”106 Third, FNGOs may treat women “suffering from injuries or illnesses 
caused by legal or illegal abortions.”107  
Importantly, FNGOs are prohibited from engaging in such activities using any 
funds, not just U.S. funds.108 DNGOs, on the other hand, are permitted to perform, 
counsel, refer, and advocate for abortion using other funds, not U.S. government 
funds, without losing their U.S. global health assistance funds.109 This discrepancy 
 
 
 100. USAID STANDARD PROVISIONS FOR NON-U.S. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
A MANDATORY REFERENCE FOR ADS CHAPTER 303, at 84 (2017) [hereinafter USAID 
PROVISIONS]. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 89.  
 103. CHAMPIONS OF GLOBAL REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
THE PROTECTING LIFE IN GLOBAL HEALTH ASSISTANCE: RESTRICTION ON U.S. GLOBAL HEALTH 
ASSISTANCE, AN UNOFFICIAL GUIDE 3–4 (2017) [hereinafter PAI].  
 104. USAID PROVISIONS, supra note 100, at 89.  
 105. Id.; see also PAI, supra note 103, at 4. 
 106. PAI, supra note 103, at 4.  
 107. USAID PROVISIONS, supra note 100, at 89.  
 108. Id. at 86; see also PAI, supra note 103, at 2 (“The policy prohibits U.S. global health 
assistance from being provided to [FNGOs] that perform abortion . . . even if these activities 
are performed with funding from other, non-U.S. government (USG) sources.”).  
 109. USAID PROVISIONS, supra note 100, at 89; cf. Heather Blakeman, Speech-
Conditioned Funding and the First Amendment: New Standard, Old Doctrine, Little Impact, 
13 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 47 (2015) (“[S]ome scholars argue the condition 
inappropriately held foreign organizations to a higher standard than their domestic 
counterparts, a discrepancy that both undermined fundamental constitutional values that the 
United States sought to promote internationally and presented the country as being 
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also existed with previous iterations of the Policy, but the funding stipulation is 
actually not required by and is, arguably, inconsistent with current statutes—
specifically, the Helms Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. Indeed, in one of 
the early challenges to the Policy in 1989, plaintiff FNGOs and DNGOs argued that 
the Policy’s restriction on the use of even non-U.S. funds violated the FAA because 
it contravened Congress’s limits and intent. However, the court held that Senator 
Helms’s statements before Congress regarding the possibility of extending the Helms 
Amendment to cover non-U.S. funds did not constitute congressional intent or 
indicate that “Congress has spoken” on the issue.110 However, given that Trump’s 
expanded GGR covers all global health assistance, and not only the traditional $600 
million in assistance, it is likely the case that Trump’s GGR is inconsistent with the 
Helms Amendment.  
II. THE POLICY’S IMPACT ON RECIPIENT FNGOS 
Supporters argue that the Policy is necessary to prohibit the use of U.S. funds for 
abortion-related activities. However, qualitative and quantitative evidence suggest 
that the Policy does not do what it purports to accomplish and, in fact, undermines 
democratic processes abroad.111  
First, World Health Organization researchers found a strong association with the 
Policy and abortion rates in sub-Saharan Africa. The study found “robust empirical 
patterns suggesting that the Mexico City Policy is associated with increases in 
abortion rates in sub-Saharan African countries” in which organizations are subject 
to the Policy.112 Specifically, the abortion rates were found to noticeably increase 
after the Policy was reinstated in 2001, and the odds of a woman having an abortion 
doubled in areas that were exposed to the Policy.113 In terms of more qualitative and 
anecdotal evidence regarding the effectiveness of the Policy, several organizations 
that have been affected by the Policy have said that they have had to choose whether 
to forgo the funding, risk having to close their clinics, or reduce staff and services.114 




 110. DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 
1989); see supra Section I.A.  
 111. Starrs, supra note 96, at 485. It should be noted that the Policy, and now Trump’s 
GGR, affects sixty-four countries because, in the 2016 fiscal year, the United States provided 
these countries with bilateral global health assistance. Of those sixty-four, thirty-seven 
countries allow legal abortion in a manner that violates the Policy. This means that in those 
thirty-seven countries, even though abortion is legal in some cases, the Policy would prevent 
FNGOs from legally performing abortions. Additionally, in twenty-seven of the sixty-four 
countries, abortion is not legal in any case and the Policy would prohibit FNGOs from 
advocating for abortion reform. See Kates & Moss, supra note 76.  
 112. Bendavid, supra note 91, at 8.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Kate & Moss, supra note 76. 
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services for several thousands of women in various countries.115 For example, an 
organization in Kenya reported closing two of their clinics because of the Policy.116 
Second, the Policy’s requirement that FNGOs not engage in any promotion, 
advocacy of, or lobbying for abortion has effectively stifled and chilled any efforts 
to reform abortion in many developing countries.117 This requirement is problematic 
for three reasons. First, there is a general understanding among scholars that the 
Policy, and specifically the gagging of FNGOs, represents a desire from politicians 
to impose their own religious moral values onto recipient countries, which tend to be 
developing countries.118 Second, the imposition of the gag rule highlights the 
hypocrisy of the Policy. The Policy does not allow FNGOs to provide services—
abortion—that women in the United States can obtain, within some limits.119 
Essentially, the Policy allows the U.S. government, and specifically conservative 
politicians, to do to foreign women what they cannot do to American women.  
Third, the egregious gag on FNGOs contradicts American foreign policy goals 
and fundamental First Amendment values. For instance, USAID has a stated goal of 
expanding democracy and improving the lives of citizens of the developing world.120 
However, the gag prevents FNGOs from participating in democratic processes, such 
as lobbying and advocating for abortion reform, and engaging in public awareness 
campaigns—all forms of democratic participation that American citizens and U.S.-
based organizations engage in. Notably, USAID has recognized the importance of 
civil participation by organizations when it identified civil society organizations as 
an important component of the freedom of association and acknowledged that such 
 
 
 115. KFF Explainer, supra note 55; see also Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, supra note 16, at 36 (Statement of Dr. Nirmal K. Bista, Director General, Family 
Planning Association of Nepal, Kathmandu, Nepal) (“[Family Planning Association of Nepal] 
has recently made the difficult and painful decision to refuse USAID family planning funds 
because of the global gag rule restrictions. This was by no means an easy decision. It will lead 
to the loss of almost $250,000 in U.S. funds and it will have a major impact on our ability to 
continue to operate reproductive health clinics in Nepal’s three most densely populated 
areas.”). 
 116. Ishbel Matheson, Kenya Split over Bush Abortion Policy, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2002), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1837283.stm [https://perma.cc/LVR5-CGHP]. See generally 
DINA BOCHEGO, ACCESS DENIED: THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL GAG RULE IN KENYA, THE 
GLOBAL GAG RULE IMPACT PROJECT (2016), https://pai.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Acc 
ess-Denied-The-Impact-of-the-Global-Gag-Rule-in-Kenya.pdf [https://perma.cc/54NL-
EJK2]. 
 117. Crimm, supra note 2, at 612. 
 118. Id. at 589; see also Hahn, supra note 25, at 421 (“This policy advances the GOP’s 
Christian anti-abortion stance to an international level; and while the American government 
has a constitutional requirement for the separation of church and state, Christian views are 
being advanced by this executive order.”); Seevers, supra note 5, at 905 (stating that the Policy 
“foists the moral and ethical values of the United States’ conservative and religious right on 
international health advocates, and presses a pro-life agenda on any [FNGO] receiving U.S. 
funding”).  
 119. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878–79 (1992); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).  
 120. Mission, Vision and Values, USAID (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-
are/mission-vision-values [https://perma.cc/2TLG-5SX2].  
994 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:977 
 
organizations “play a vital role in educating the public and the government on 
important local and national issues.”121  
However, the gag substantially undermines this view. For example, the director 
general, Dr. Nirmal K. Bista, from the Family Planning Association of Nepal 
(FPAN), explained how the gag rule affects the organization. FPAN took part in a 
movement, led by the Nepalese government, to address high maternal mortality rates 
in Nepal.122 The government concluded that one of the best ways to address the 
maternal mortality rate was to legalize abortion, and the Nepalese Ministry of Health 
therefore sought to introduce legislation to decriminalize abortion.123 Accordingly, 
FPAN and a coalition of doctors, health NGOs, human rights activists, and women’s 
groups spearheaded an advocacy campaign in favor of legalizing abortion.124 Dr. 
Bista testified, however, that FPAN decided to forgo USAID funding because it 
would mean that FPAN could not engage in any advocacy effort to legalize abortion 
in Nepal, even if the efforts were carried out with non-U.S. money and with the 
support of the Nepalese government.125 At the core of this issue is the categorical 
inability to participate in the democratic processes; indeed, Dr. Bista said, “I would 
be prevented from speaking in my own country to my own government about a health 
care crisis I know firsthand, but, by rejecting U.S. funds, I put our clinics, clinics 
addressing that same health care crisis, in very real jeopardy.”126 
Opponents of the Policy dubbed it the “Global Gag Rule” for a reason—the 
Policy, in a very real sense, prevents citizens in foreign countries and FNGOs who 
work on important health care and women’s reproductive health issues from 
speaking about abortion.127 The gag is, at its core, a misguided Policy that assumes 
that abortion issues around the world are analogous to those in the United States. As 
Dr. Bista points out, “[i]t is hard, then, to understand how U.S. lawmakers are so 
 
 
 121. US AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND 
GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 5 (1998) 
[hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE]; see also USAID STRATEGY ON DEMOCRACY, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE 4 (2013); 
Seevers, supra note 5, at 919 (“NGOs were recognized by USAID as essential actors in 
democracy promotion, however much of an NGO’s ability to foster democratic participation 
hinges on its ability to speak openly and advocate to local and national government actors.”).  
 122. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 16, at 37 (Statement 
of Dr. Nirmal K. Bista, Director General, Family Planning Association of Nepal, Kathmandu, 
Nepal). It should be note that, at the time of Dr. Bista’s testimony, Nepal had one of the highest 
maternal mortality rates in the world—much of it because of unsafe abortion. See id. 
Consequently, women who are found to have had an abortion are imprisoned. At the time of 
Dr. Bista’s testimony, “[o]ne in five women [were] imprisoned in Nepal” for having obtained 
an abortion. Id. at 38. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 37.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Smith, Martinez & Mor, supra note 5. Latin American NGOs have created an 
advocacy strategy that includes communicating with government officials and campaigning 
to build awareness of abortion issues. The gag undermines these efforts; see also Bonnie L. 
Shepard, NGO Advocacy Networks in Latin America: Lessons from Experience in Promoting 
Women’s and Reproductive Rights, at 9 (North-South Agenda, Paper No. 61, 2003).  
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easily able to implement such a far-reaching and damaging policy when the 
differences between our countries are so vast and the realities that women in Nepal 
face are so unimaginable.”128  
The Policy has been challenged several times because of its problematic effects 
on recipient FNGOs and foreign citizens, but such challenges have been unsuccessful 
because of issues demonstrating standing.129 However, immediately after Trump 
reinstated his version of the GGR, a bipartisan group of senators sought to 
permanently repeal it. For instance, Senator Jeanne Shaheen introduced legislation 
aimed at repealing Trump’s GGR (essentially doing what Republicans did to 
President Clinton).130 The following Part explores recent challenges to the 
constitutionality of the Policy and examines how the Policy undermines and is 
contrary to First Amendment values.  
III. THE POLICY & THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
The Policy is widely controversial because it would be considered an 
unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment grounds if it were applied to 
DNGOs. This misalignment between what is permitted at home and what is 
permitted abroad fundamentally undermines the United States’ position as the 
world’s model democracy.131 This Part examines this misalignment through the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, government speech, and First Amendment 
values in order to argue that the Policy, notwithstanding standing issues,132 should 
be considered unconstitutional because it fundamentally conflicts with First 
Amendment values. 
A. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 
Generally, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that the “government 
may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional 
right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”133 That is, even 
 
 
 128. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 16, at 38 (Statement 
of Dr. Nirmal K. Bista, Director General, Family Planning Association of Nepal, Kathmandu, 
Nepal).  
 129. See supra Section I.C. 
 130. See Global Health, Empowerment and Rights Act, S. 210, 115th Cong. (2017), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/210 [https://perma.cc/HY4A-
F5RH]; see also supra Section I.C.2; Shaheen Challenges Sec. Tillerson on Global Gag Rule, 
JEANNE SHAHEEN: U.S. SENATOR FOR N.H. (June 13, 2017), https://www.shaheen.senate.gov 
/news/multimedia/watch/shaheen-challenges-sec-tillerson-on-global-gag-rule [https://perma 
.cc/74SB-BDHG].  
 131. See Crimm, supra note 2, at 618.  
 132. Cf. Blakeman, supra note 109, at 28 (“Because Congress can allocate foreign aid 
funds to foreign recipients, who are not entitled to First Amendment protection, instead of to 
U.S. recipients, it can bypass the constitutional limits on speech-conditioned foreign aid 
funding.”). 
 133. Crimm, supra note 2, at 618 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989)); see also Chase Ruffin, You Don’t Have 
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if the individual or organization has no entitlement to the government benefit, 
funding, or aid, a condition that infringes on the recipient’s constitutionally protected 
rights, such as the First Amendment, is unconstitutional.134 The government cannot 
coerce individuals or organizations into surrendering a constitutional right in order 
to obtain some funding or aid.135 The doctrine reflects the notion that “government 
may not do indirectly what it may not do directly over the view that the greater power 
to deny a benefit includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt.”136 
For example, in Speiser v. Randall, the Supreme Court held that a state law requiring 
veterans to take an oath declaring that they would not advocate to overthrow the 
government in order to receive a tax exemption did not constitute a compelling state 
interest and resulted in the suppression of protected speech.137  
B. Right to Free Speech  
Despite much uncertainty regarding whether a government condition implicates 
free speech, courts have considered, among other things, whether the condition has 
a coercive effect on the recipient, whether the condition constitutes government 
speech, and whether the condition constitutes a viewpoint-based regulation.138  
1. Rust v. Sullivan  
In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court upheld conditions attached to funding from the 
Department of Health and Human Services through Title X.139 The conditions 
prohibited recipients from using Title X funding for family planning programs in 
which abortion was considered a method of family planning.140 The conditions 
prohibited recipients from (1) “provid[ing] counseling concerning the use of abortion 
as a method of family planning or provid[ing] referral for abortion as a method of 
family planning,”141 (2) “engaging in activities that ‘encourage, promote or advocate 
abortion as a method of family planning,’”142 and (3) requiring that recipient Title X 
 
 
to, but It’s in Your Best Interest: Requiring Express Ideological Statements as Conditions on 
Federal Funding, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2013).  
 134. Blakeman, supra note 109, at 33; see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 
U.S. 194 (2003) (holding that the Children’s Internet Protection Act did not impose an 
unconstitutional condition on public libraries and did not violate library patrons’ First 
Amendment rights).  
 135. The governmental condition need not be inherently coercive. “[The doctrine] seeks to 
identify those conditions on funding that have a coercive effect on the recipient’s freedom to 
exercise her constitutional rights on her own time and with her own resources.” David Cole, 
Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded 
Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 680 (1992).  
 136. Sullivan, supra note 133, at 1415.  
 137. See generally Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).  
 138. Ruffin, supra note 133, at 1134.  
 139. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 179.  
 142. Id. at 180 (quoting 42 CFR § 59.8(a)(1) (1989)). 
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projects be organized so that they are “‘physically and financially separate’ from 
prohibited abortion activities” (in other words, keeping the funds separated).143 
Petitioners challenged the conditions on First Amendment grounds and argued 
that the conditions “violate the free speech rights of private health care organizations 
that receive Title X funds . . . by impermissibly imposing viewpoint-discriminatory 
conditions on government subsidies and thus penalize speech funded with non-Title 
X monies.”144 In addition, the Petitioners contended that the restrictions were 
impermissible because they required the relinquishment of their constitutional right 
to engage in abortion advocacy and counseling.145 The Petitioners acknowledged that 
the government can legally impose conditions, but “it may not discriminate 
invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous 
ideas.”146 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the Petitioners’ 
arguments and upheld the conditions attached to the Title X funding. First, Rehnquist 
noted that Title X recipients can engage in activities otherwise prohibited by Title X 
with their non-Title X funds.147 That is, the government is not denying a benefit but 
rather requiring that the Title X funds “be spent for the purposes for which they were 
authorized.”148 Justice Rehnquist also rejected the Petitioners’ argument that the Title 
X conditions aim at suppressing “dangerous ideas,” and instead found that the 
restriction is a “prohibition on a project grantee . . . from engaging in activities 
outside the project’s scope.”149 
Additionally, the majority rejected the argument that the restrictions constituted 
viewpoint discrimination because it permitted antiabortion speech and acts while 
impermissibly discriminating against pro-abortion speech. The Court noted that the 
Petitioners’ logic incorrectly “boil[ed] down to the position that if the Government 
chooses to subsidize one protected right, it must subsidize analogous counterpart 
rights.”150 In other words, the government may selectively fund programs to the 
exclusion of others without discriminating on the basis of viewpoint.151 In effect, the 
government can make value judgements regarding the programs it chooses to fund 
because subsidies are just subsidies.152 
With regard to government speech, the Title X programs were interpreted as 
venues of government speech that are transmitted through private doctors.153 
 
 
 143. Id. (42 CFR § 59.9 (1989)).  
 144. Id. at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 145. Id. at 196.  
 146. Id. at 192 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)).  
 147. Id. at 196–97. 
 148. Id. at 196.  
 149. Id. at 194.  
 150. Id.; see Crimm, supra note 2, at 620.  
 151. Ruffin, supra note 133, at 1138; see also Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First 
Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based 
Underinclusion, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29, 37 (1992). 
 152. Kagan, supra note 151, at 37.  
 153. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (explaining that Rust 
allows viewpoint-based funding because the government was speaking through a private entity). 
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Generally, the government may “speak” to further its policies by funding private 
entities to convey government speech, but it may not regulate speech based on 
viewpoints.154 Government speech has been largely criticized because “[w]hen the 
government speaks through subsidy schemes, it may change and reshape the 
underlying dialogue.”155 Speakers may forgo speech because the government 
decided not to fund them, government funding may distort the private speech it funds, 
and, overall, “[w]e do not know whether to treat the speakers as independent or hired 
guns.”156 This issue is particularly salient in the realm of abortion funding, as it was 
in Rust, because the government’s selective subsidization of some speech, to the 
exclusion of others, means that the government can steer “public discourse on 
controversial issues.”157  
2. Alliance for Open Society International v. USAID 
Furthermore, the Court distinguished Rust in Alliance for Open Society 
International v. USAID.158 In Alliance, three DNGOs that worked to eliminate the 
spread of HIV/AIDS often worked closely with those engaged in prostitution.159 Two 
of the organizations were receiving federal funds under the U.S. Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (“Leadership Act”), and were 
thus required to expressly oppose prostitution.160 The plaintiff DNGOs argued that 
the condition compelled them to engage in speech and coerced them to refrain from 
activities that were financed solely from private funds.161 The Court held that the 
conditions attached to the funding violated the First Amendment because they 
required “recipients to profess a specific belief, the Policy Requirement [went] 
beyond defining the limits of the federally funded program to defining the 
recipient.”162 The Court distinguished this holding from Rust by noting that in Rust 
the conditions placed were “designed to ensure that the limits of the federal program” 
were observed.163 However, the Leadership Act went beyond the limits of the 
federally funded program.164 
 
 
 154. Ruffin, supra note 133, at 1139; see also Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, 
Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 577 (1996) (explaining 
that “government may not foster public acceptance of its own viewpoints on these issues by 
manipulating private expression”). 
 155. Kagan, supra note 151, at 55; see also Helen Norton, The Measure of Government 
Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 596 (2008) (explaining the 
concern that “the government may manipulate the public’s attitudes towards its views by 
deliberately obscuring its identity as a message’s source”). 
 156. Kagan, supra note 151, at 55. 
 157. Ruffin, supra note 133, at 1140; see Kagan, supra note 151, at 55. 
 158. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013).  
 159. Id. at 210–11.  
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.   
 162. Id. at 218. 
 163. Id. at 217 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)). 
 164. Id. at 218. Justice Scalia dissented arguing that the Act’s restrictions were indeed 
within the program’s mandate because the elimination or prostitution falls within the goals of 
the HIV/AIDS program. See id. at 224 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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3. The Policy and Free Speech  
If the Trump GGR and its previous iterations were applied domestically, it would 
likely be considered unconstitutional.165 Indeed, what distinguishes the Policy from 
Rust and Alliance is that there is no separation in the use of funds; the Policy restricts 
the use of all funds for all abortion-related activities, including performing abortion 
and advocating for abortion reform.166 That is to say, the Policy’s requirement that 
recipients categorically refrain from abortion-related activities using any funds is an 
unconstitutional condition on funding. In Rust, the Court found that the restriction 
on Title X funds was meant to ensure that “public funds be spent for the purposes for 
which they were authorized.”167 Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that the recipients 
of Title X funds could still engage in abortion-related activities “through programs 
that are separate and independent from the project that receives Title X funds.”168  
Herein lies the unconstitutionality of the Policy. The Policy does not allow for 
“separate and independent” projects. It requires that recipient FNGOs refrain from 
engaging in any activity that relates to abortion. This is most clearly seen with the 
use of funds—the Policy does not allow recipients to use non-U.S. funds for abortion-
related activities. With the Trump GGR, the unconstitutionality of the conditions is 
even more visible. Since the conditions now apply to all funds for global health 
assistance, including organizations that primarily specialize in, for example, 
HIV/AIDS or the Zika virus, nonabortion-specific FNGOs cannot coordinate with 
FNGOs that engage in abortion-related services because the Trump GGR does not 
permit it. That is, nonabortion organizations are likely less inclined to seek 
partnerships with abortion-specific organizations out of fear that they will get “linked 
to something controversial that could affect them.”169 If DNGOs were not allowed to 
 
 
 165. This argument does not take into consideration issues of standing. See supra Section 
I.C.1 (explaining unsuccessful early challenges to the Policy). Instead, this argument focuses 
on whether the Policy would be considered constitutional if applied to domestic organizations. 
However, several have argued that issues of standing should not restrict an FNGO from 
challenging the Policy. See, e.g., Su, supra note 69; Zick, supra note 18; Timothy Zick, The 
First Amendment in Transborder Perspective: Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 
B.C. L. REV. 941 (2011).  
 166. Crimm has argued that the Policy would be considered unconstitutional under Rust 
because, if the Policy conditions were applied to DNGOs, it would “involve ‘situations in 
which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a 
particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the 
[First Amendment] protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program.’” 
Crimm, supra note 2, at 629 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 173).  
 167. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Cf. CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, BREAKING THE SILENCE: THE GLOBAL GAG RULE’S 
IMPACT ON UNSAFE ABORTION, 11 (2003) [hereinafter BREAKING THE SILENCE]; Starrs, supra 
note 96, at 486 (“NGOs in low-income settings often provide integrated health services; for 
instance, they offer patients contraceptive care, HIV prevention or treatment, maternal health 
screenings, immunisations [sic], and information on safe abortion care all under one roof. By 
expanding the gag rule to the full scope of US global health aid, hundreds more national and 
local NGOs will be forced to choose between drastic funding cuts (if they decline to sign the 
gag rule) or denying their patients . . . information.”).  
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engage in abortion-related services with non-U.S. funds, as the Policy currently 
requires of FNGOs, the condition would very likely be considered unconstitutional 
under Rust.  
The fact that a court would find the Policy unconstitutional if it were applied to 
domestic organizations is deeply problematic because it “presents the United States 
as two-faced.”170 If the United States is to maintain its standing as the world’s model 
democracy, it should not undermine democratic ideals and First Amendment doctrine 
and values in other countries. The following Part explains these First Amendment 
values and argues that, in order to abide by these values, the United States should 
repeal this far-reaching Policy.  
IV. AN APPEAL TO FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES 
The First Amendment does not, and should not, merely protect “speech as 
such.”171 The scope of the Amendment extends to speech that implicates core 
constitutional values: the marketplace of ideas, individual autonomy, and democratic 
self-government. These values reflect the United States’ deep commitment to 
protecting freedom of speech.172 Indeed, U.S. foreign policy is largely premised on 
the goal of promoting such values abroad in order to ensure global security and peace 
in developing countries; this belief in the possibility of exporting democracy forms 
the groundwork for foreign aid programs.173 The Mexico City Policy presumably 
once fell into this category of using foreign aid to create stability—in this case, global 
health security—but is now a mechanism through which the United States exports 
Republican conservative values regarding abortion and family planning. The 
consistent rescission and reinstatement of the Policy over the past thirty years is itself 
telling. If the United States regards First Amendment values as foundational to our 
commitment to protecting free speech, then the Mexico City Policy should be 
repealed because it is unconstitutional. The gagging of foreign citizens and foreign 
nongovernmental organizations is undemocratic and runs contrary to First 
Amendment values.  
In his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes aptly 
captured the scope of the “marketplace of ideas” when he said: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations 
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by 
free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is 
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.174 
 
 
 170. Crimm, supra note 2, at 631.  
 171. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 478 (1997) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); see also Post, supra note 21, at 478.  
 172. Post, supra note 21, at 477–78.  
 173. See generally DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 121.  
 174. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
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The “marketplace of ideas” refers to the creation of new knowledge, which 
requires freedom of thought and of speech.175 The notion which Holmes captured is 
that all ideas are worth being expressed, regardless of whether they are “false” or 
“true.” Indeed, the marketplace will sort out the “good” and “bad” ideas.176 As such, 
“[t]he First Amendment recognizes no such things as a ‘false’ idea.”177 Additionally, 
the value of individual autonomy refers to the equality of all ideas because of the 
equality among all speakers. This value is also dubbed “self-fulfillment.” However, 
this autonomy often conflicts with the autonomy of the listener in situations of, for 
example, defamation and privacy.178 
Perhaps most salient for the purposes of this Comment, the value of democratic 
self-governance refers to the relationship between individuals and their government 
and to the ability of those individuals to potentially change or author future law, 
engage in decision-making through elections and referenda, and participate in 
forming public opinion on issues in controversy.179 USAID has recognized that a 
“hallmark of a democratic society is the freedom of individuals to associate with like-
minded individuals, express their views publicly, openly debate public policy, and 
petition their government.”180 Indeed, it is through the advocacy efforts of such 
organizations that “people are given a voice in the process of formulating public 
policy.”181  
The Mexico City Policy, and now Trump’s GGR, contradicts this foundational 
understanding of democratic self-governance and the marketplace of ideas. First, by 
requiring that recipient FNGOs not “perform or actively promote abortion as a 
method of family planning in foreign countries [or] provide financial support to any 
other [FNGO] that conducts such activities,”182 the United States is preventing 
FNGOs from engaging in core democratic processes. For instance, as explained 
earlier in this Comment, Dr. Bista and FPAN were put in the unfortunate situation of 
having to decide whether to accept USAID funds in order to keep open health clinics 
and thereby be prohibited from advocating for the decriminalization of abortion in 
order to minimize Nepal’s maternal mortality rate.183 Dr. Bista and FPAN decided to 
forgo the funds in order to advocate for reforming abortion laws and potentially help 
author legislation that decriminalizes abortion in Nepal.  
 
 
 175. Cf. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 
258 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“For the so-called ‘marketplace of ideas’ that is vital for a free society 
to function properly and to flourish, sustaining the people-to-government power equilibrium 
as constitutionally calibrated demands a number of checks long recognized in First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”).  
 176. See Post, supra note 21, at 479.  
 177. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (citing Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1947)).  
 178. See Post, supra note 21, at 480.  
 179. Id. at 482.  
 180. DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 121, at 15; see also COHEN, supra note  
6, at 1.  
 181. DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 121, at 15.  
 182. USAID PROVISIONS, supra note 100, at 86.  
 183. See supra Part II. 
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Likewise, FNGOs in Latin America have voiced similar concerns regarding the 
undemocratic nature of the Policy. Susana Silva Galdos, president of the FNGO 
Movimiento Manuela Ramos, experienced the undemocratic nature of the Policy 
when she made a statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations.184 Movimiento Manuela Ramos, a recipient FNGO, was subject to the gag 
at the time Galdos gave her statement, which meant that Galdos had to obtain special 
authorization in federal court to even testify before the Committee. Senator Barbara 
Boxer noted at the time of the hearing, “It’s almost unimaginable that a witness that 
a United States Senator asked to come here actually had to go to court to get a 
restraining order in order to speak in this, the freest and greatest country in the 
world.”185 Later in the hearing, Senator Boxer told Galdos; “[Y]ou are ungagged and 
you are here in the U.S. Senate, and you may take that gag off.”186 Galdos and 
Movimiento Manuela Ramos were, in a very real sense, gagged from participating 
in public policy, from contributing to the efforts in Peru to decriminalize abortion, 
and, generally, from engaging in one the most fundamental and basic forms of 
democratic participation.187  
Second, the Policy has had the effect of chilling speech abroad and thereby 
undermines the First Amendment value regarding the marketplace of ideas.188 For 
example, this categorical prohibition on any abortion advocacy or campaign to raise 
awareness regarding abortion has had the overall effect of chilling reproductive 
rights advocacy in Peru.189 Indeed, some international donors have even stated that 
“there are fewer groups doing advocacy or fewer groups creating a counter balance 
against pro-life activists.”190 An NGO in Peru, referring to the degree of care with 
which recipient FNGOs must speak, stated that “organizations have to be more 
careful about getting linked to something controversial that could affect them, and 
that can produce self-censorship.”191 Problematically, and contrary to notions 
regarding the marketplace of ideas, the gag rule supports one-sidedness in public 
discourse regarding abortion—specifically, in developing countries with harsh 
antiabortion laws (and sometimes the government’s antiabortion stance is written 
into the constitution). For instance, a recipient FNGO in Ethiopia noted that debates 
regarding abortion “will not be informed and balanced if organizations supporting 
abortion liberalization are unable to speak about out it.”192 The Policy has certainly 
had a chilling effect on recipient FNGOs by prohibiting them from introducing new 
knowledge to the marketplace of ideas regarding unsafe and clandestine abortion, 
 
 
 184. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 16 (statement of 
Susana Silva Galdos, President, Movement Manuela Ramos, Lima Peru). 
 185. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer).  
 186. Id. at 28.  
 187. See Seevers, supra note 5, at 923 (“[B]ecause the Global Gag Rule creates a barrier 
to advocacy and a limitation on free speech related to abortion, Peruvian organizations are 
prevented from addressing one of the major health dangers in Peru.”). 
 188. Watts, supra note 76 (“[The Gag] will have a chilling impact on the work done by US 
organization that work with Latin American women’s groups that advocate safe abortion.”).  
 189. Seevers, supra note 5, at 927.  
 190. BREAKING THE SILENCE, supra note 169, at 13.  
 191. Id. at 11.  
 192. Id. at 13.  
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inducing self-censorship because of the fear that the organization will be perceived 
as violating the gag rule, and skewing public discourse regarding abortion.  
Regardless of current First Amendment doctrine regarding unconstitutional 
conditions, government speech, and free speech, the Policy should be considered 
unconstitutional and be repealed because it contradicts fundamental First 
Amendment values, as demonstrated above. In addition, the inherent hypocrisy of 
the Policy casts an unforgiving shadow on the United States’ position as a model 
democracy for the world. The Policy sends the message that the United States will 
claim to promote First Amendment values abroad through foreign policy and foreign 
aid, yet substantially prohibit the realization of such values through the Policy. 
However, given the back-and-forth nature of the Policy over the past thirty years, it 
is likely difficult to obtain an outright and permanent repeal. Accordingly, lawmakers 
should also consider limiting the scope of the Policy so that it is more consistent with 
the Helms Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act.193  
CONCLUSION  
The Mexico City Policy has been previously justified by the conviction that 
taxpayers should not have to pay for abortion-related services. Indeed, after 
reinstating the Policy in 2001, President Bush said that it was his “conviction that 
taxpayer funds should not be used to pay for abortions or advocate or actively 
promote abortion, either here or abroad.”194 This is, of course, a valid motivation, but 
the consequences of the Policy cannot be justified solely on this motivation. 
Anecdotal and qualitative evidence has shown that the Policy has incredibly 
damaging effects on the health of women around the world, undermines democratic 
values, and does not even accomplish what it purportedly sets out to do—reduce the 
number of abortions. In light of these findings, this Comment argued that the Policy 
should be repealed because it would be unconstitutional if applied to DNGOs and, 
importantly, because it substantially undermines First Amendment values. Women’s 





 193. See supra Section I.A. 
 194. Memorandum on Restoration of the Mexico City Policy, 2001 PUB. PAPERS 10 (Jan. 
22, 2001). 
